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Abstract: Severe poverty is a major global problem about risk and inequality. 
What, if any, is the relationship between equality, fairness and responsibility in 
an unequal world? I argue for four conclusions. The first is the moral urgency of 
severe poverty. We have too many global neighbours that exist in a state of 
emergency and whose suffering is intolerable. The second is that severe 
poverty is a problem concerning global injustice that is relevant, but not 
restricted, to questions about responsibility. If none were responsible, this does 
not eliminate all compelling claims to provide assistance. The third is that 
severe poverty represents an inequality too far; it is a condition of extremity 
with denial of basic needs. The fourth is that there is a need for an approach 
that captures all relevant cases – and the capabilities approach and the 
connection theory of remedial responsibilities are highlighted as having special 
promise.  
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1. Introduction 
Inequality is found in several different varieties. Each has significance although 
not always a case of injustice. It is not an injustice that we are unequal in our 
abilities to entertain or solve complex scientific puzzles, but there may be 
injustice where the lack of such abilities brings starvation or worse. Severe 
poverty is a variety of inequality that represents injustice. Fellow human beings 
that suffer in this condition exist in a state of emergency. The statistics are 
alarming in their scale and they call for action. About half the world’s population 
lives in conditions of severe poverty. The World Bank estimates that 46% of 
humanity subsist on less than about $2 per day. Those below this threshold fall 
almost 45% beneath it. Severe poverty exposes people to major risks to their 
future health and livelihoods: for example, one-third of all human deaths have 
poverty-related causes, or about 50,000 people each day including 34,000 
children under the age of five (see Pogge 2002, 2; Pogge 2007, 2). Severe poverty 
is a major global problem about risk and inequality. 
Of course, the considerations raised here have an international dimension 
rather than a domestic focus. What, if any, is the relationship between equality, 
fairness and responsibility in an unequal world? These issues are complex and I 
cannot do full justice to illuminating all of the important relevant considerations. 
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Nevertheless, I will draw attention to some remarks about this subject that 
interest me and I hope help contribute to wider discussions on this topic. 
2. Negative Duties and Severe Poverty 
One popular view is that ‘we’ (or ‘we, the citizens of affluent democratic 
societies’) have a negative duty to end severe poverty. The view claims that 
severe poverty is a grave wrong for which we are responsible. This position is 
exemplified in the writings of Thomas Pogge. He argues that affluent societies 
knowingly, foreseeably, and avoidably maintain a global order that perpetuates 
severe poverty through protectionism and international monetary bodies like 
the IMF and World Bank (Pogge 2002). Affluent societies dictate the terms on 
which societies with severe poverty must often accept. We, the citizens of 
affluent democratic societies, share responsibility for this global state of affairs 
because we elect leaders who choose to maintain this global order. One 
conclusion is that voters should more actively support candidates who endorse a 
less exploitative international system.  
A second conclusion of greater concern for me here is that we have 
responsibility for the maintenance of severe poverty elsewhere. The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights states that:  
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-
being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical 
care... Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the 
rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized (UDHR, 
Articles 25 and 28).    
A global order that perpetuates severe poverty might represent a breach of 
human rights; it would deny the right to an adequate standard of living on any 
measure and prevent individuals from satisfying their most basic needs. 
This view has attracted widespread support, but it has received criticisms 
as well. Many colleagues, and perhaps most of my students, accept the need for 
action in ending severe poverty while rejecting the argument that they share 
some significant responsibility for the continued existence of severe poverty 
found today. I note this reservation but without an interest in taking sides. 
The argument about any negative duties to others in severe poverty 
captures something compelling about responsibility for global inequalities. If we 
were responsible for the creation of severe poverty elsewhere, then this 
provides a strong reason for us to end our responsibility and end severe poverty 
if we are able. So the issue is not about whether we should end severe poverty if 
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3. Positive Duties and Severe Poverty 
This leads us to a further consideration: should we have a duty to end severe 
poverty if we were not responsible? If so, then we might be able to sidestep the 
issue of our responsibility. The classic argument for this view is expressed by 
Peter Singer in his famous essay ‘Famine, Affluence, and Morality’ (1972). His 
argumentative strategy is familiar to most academic philosophers: the use of a 
hypothetical situation meant to confirm intuitive evidence in favour of a specific 
view about justice. Singer asks us to imagine that we find a child drowning in a 
shallow pond. Rescuing the child will require our getting wet, perhaps damaging 
our clothing, and possible inconvenience. Singer believes our intuitions confirm 
that we should rescue the child in this case. This view is encapsulated in what we 
might call ‘the assistance principle’: 
if it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby 
sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do 
it (Singer 1972, 388). 
The assistance principle focuses on relative moral weights. We weigh the moral 
costs to ourselves if we do act against the moral costs to the child if we did not 
act. Singer argues that the moral costs to the child are higher if we did not act – 
and this measurement supports our saving the child. Note that we should save 
the drowning child notwithstanding how the child came to start drowning: we 
should rescue the child regardless of the circumstances leading to this need for 
rescue. This is often characterized as our having a positive duty to rescue. We 
rescue where we can and irrespective of whether we are responsible for the 
situation of need. 
Singer’s example is meant to confirm something important about justice 
and any duties to assist others, namely, the general irrelevance of desert, 
identity, and distance. This is not a claim about their complete irrelevance, but 
something else. It may be relevant that you are far from me, but only where 
distance forbids me an opportunity to provide some means of rescue. It is not the 
distance between us that matters per se; it is whether there are available 
opportunities to provide assistance that matters most on this view. Perhaps I 
bear no responsibility for the severe poverty endured by a stranger in a distant 
land. If it were possible for me to provide assistance in some form, then I have a 
positive duty to do so where the moral costs to me in acting are less than the 
moral costs to others should I fail to act. If the sacrifice of enjoying the purchase 
of a new electric guitar would provide funds that might save a life elsewhere, 
then my sacrifice is almost trivial in comparison to the suffering it would help 
avoid or prevent. If I am able to contribute to severe poverty relief, then it is 
morally unimportant whether I am responsible for it, who you are, and how far 
away you live all things considered. 
Many students are compelled by this second view about justice. They are 
convinced that they have some positive duty to save the lives they can if they are 
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able to do so (see Singer 2009). But this acceptance is far from universal. A 
repeated concern is that responsibility can matter. Perhaps severe poverty is an 
unjust condition of inequality that should end. Why should the burdens for this 
important task rest only on the shoulders of those who grieve at this suffering? 
4. Unified Conceptions 
Let me briefly summarise the discussion thus far. Severe poverty is a condition of 
extreme inequality. We have surveyed two opposing views leading to a similar 
conclusion on different grounds. The first view is that we have a negative duty to 
end severe poverty because we are responsible in some way for it. The second 
view argues that we have a positive duty to end severe poverty where the moral 
cost to ourselves in acting is less than the moral cost to others from our inaction. 
Both views make the case for ending severe poverty based upon a view about 
justice although they disagree on how this should be understood. They want us 
to choose between ending severe poverty because of our moral responsibility or 
rather in recognition of relative moral costs. 
We are not at a crossroads and there is a ‘third way’. I now draw attention 
to two proposals that illuminate how we might address positive and negative 
duties. The first is the connection theory of remedial responsibility developed by 
David Miller (2007). The idea of remedial responsibility is simple; its 
presentation as a connection theory is more complex. Remedial responsibilities 
are our responsibilities to remedy severe poverty as understood here. Miller 
understands severe poverty to be a condition of an emergency. The main 
problem is not to convince ourselves that we should act to end severe poverty, 
but rather who should act. He accepts that Pogge and Singer each address 
important considerations. Miller’s concern is that each offers an incomplete 
account. Thus, perhaps Pogge is correct to claim that there are global institutions 
responsible for at least some severe poverty today. Miller claims that it remains 
true that not every case of severe poverty is attributable to these institutions. 
One example is the tsunami of 2004 estimated to have killed more than 250,000 
people in over a dozen countries and trigger a major humanitarian catastrophe. 
The fact that not all severe poverty is the responsibility of human behaviour does 
not render its problems less urgent. Responsibility may play an important role 
although not the only one. Singer may be correct that we should act from a moral 
duty to do what we can to end severe poverty, but fail to appreciate that our 
moral duties may be unequal.  
Miller argues for a connection theory to help us determine who has 
responsibilities to remedy those in most need. He provides a useful list of six 
different connections. These relate to the causal and/or moral responsibility for 
the situation, whether another polity shares in some form of community with 
another in need, and whether a polity has the capacity to assist. We consider the 
relative set of connections polities have to another in need and consider their 
weight. No connection is claimed to have any special priority over others 
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although this wrongly assumes we might ever hold a polity remedially 
responsible to address problems it lacks the capacity to perform (see Brooks 
2011 and Brooks 2014). So we must first consider all polities in light of their 
potential capacity and those that possess this feature are then considered by the 
strength of any further connections. The fact any polity may provide rescue does 
not require that it must do so. Some may have stronger connections to particular 
cases and, thus, possess greater remedial responsibilities to act. Negative duties, 
such as the moral responsibility for contributing to severe poverty, and positive 
duties, such as the moral responsibility to act where possible, both capture 
something important and best understood in a coherent, unified account such as 
this. 
A second unified proposal is the capabilities approach championed most 
prominently by Amartya Sen (1999) and Martha Nussbaum (2000, 2011). The 
capabilities approach is a freedom-based account (Brooks 2012). It addresses 
the capabilities each individual should possess guaranteed by the state. A 
capability is the ability to do or be. It is meant to highlight a fundamental 
distinction concerning freedom and justice. The classic example is the difference 
between someone fasting and another starving. Their difference is captured by 
the capability someone fasting has to choose to fast and the starving person’s 
lacking capability to choose this situation. Both may have similar actual 
functionings – for example, both may not have eaten for the same time period – 
but only one has choice. Moreover, this is a choice about something fundamental 
to human flourishing, namely, bodily health. Nussbaum provides us with a list of 
capabilities, including life, bodily health, bodily integrity, practical reason, and 
the social bases of self-respect amongst others (see Nussbaum 2000, 78-80; 
Nussbaum 2011, 33-34). She argues that the state should guarantee some 
threshold of capability satisfaction for all. Individuals may choose against 
exercising certain capabilities, but it should remain their right to choose on these 
matters of fundamental human concern. 
The capabilities approach illuminates a different perspective on severe 
poverty. The latter is problematic for far more reasons than a condition of 
hunger which the capabilities approach helps clarify. Severe poverty threatens 
bodily health and even lives, but also denies other essential freedoms such as our 
abilities to exercise our imagination and control our environment. The pursuit of 
higher learning has often been closed to those living hand-to-mouth and not 
because the latter lack intellectual ability; severe poverty damages our lives 
physically, intellectually, and worse. The capabilities approach helps us better 
perceive these often overlooked features essential to our satisfactorily 
addressing this problem. 
Furthermore, the capabilities approach speaks to views of both positive 
and negative duties. It is an injustice where anyone is not guaranteed a life above 
some social minimum of capability enjoyment. The fact that someone is beneath 
this threshold is cause enough for action. But there are responsibilities as well, 
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including those of our political state, to guarantee all lives have access to at least 
a minimal threshold of capabilities. All severe poverty represents a failure to 
secure living standards above a satisfactory capability threshold. There is a duty 
to remove this failure and improve standards. But some may have a greater role 
to play than others institutionally and perhaps individually. The capabilities 
approach then can address different kinds of duties from within a unified 
account of justice. 
There is much more that can and should be said about unified accounts 
provided by Miller, Sen, and Nussbaum (see Brooks 2015). My aim is merely 
suggestive and to draw attention to how we might bring together positive and 
negative duties into a single and coherent view of justice. Its attractiveness is the 
ability to address more cases of severe poverty than if merely supporting one 
side or the other. 
5. Conclusion 
So where does this brief discussion leave us? The first is the moral urgency of 
severe poverty. We have too many global neighbours that exist in a state of 
emergency and whose suffering is intolerable. The second is that severe poverty 
is a problem concerning global injustice that is relevant, but not restricted, to 
questions about responsibility. If none were responsible, this does not eliminate 
all compelling claims to provide assistance. The third is that severe poverty 
represents an inequality too far; it is a condition of extremity with denial of basic 
needs. The fourth is that there is a need for an approach that captures all 
relevant cases: I have merely suggested that unified accounts – whether a 
connection theory or the capabilities approach – has special promise.  
Whatever else is understood by equality, fairness, and responsibility in 
global perspective, severe poverty represents an inequality too far and it pushes 
us to consider fair procedures to determine any responsibilities for each of us to 
provide remedy. Eradicating severe poverty does not make us angels and it is 
one of many moral challenges we face together. But it would be a surefooted step 
in a better direction we should accept. 
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